Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules

Abstract The task of aggregating individual judgments over logically interconnected propositions is called judgment aggregation. Manipulation of judgment aggregation procedures has first been studied by List [45] and Dietrich and List [27] , and Endriss et al. [30] were the first to study it from a computational perspective. Baumeister et al. [7] extended their results on manipulation and introduced the concept of bribery in judgment aggregation, again focusing on algorithmic and complexity-theoretic properties. Complementing this previous work on strategic scenarios, we introduce the concept of control in judgment aggregation, making use of the preference types introduced by Dietrich and List [27] and studying the class of uniform premise-based quota rules for these control problems in terms of their computational complexity.

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