On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties

In this paper, we introduce a sufficient condition on the domain of admissible preferences of a social choice mechanism under which the properties of individual and coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent. Then, we illustrate the usefulness of this general result in the case where a fixed budget has to be allocated among several pure public goods.

[1]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance , 1977 .

[2]  H. Moulin.  Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness , 1999 .

[3]  H. Moulin.  On strategy-proofness and single peakedness , 1980 .

[4]  John A. Weymark.  Decomposable Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions , 1999 .

[5]  M. Breton,et al.  Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability , 1999 .

[6]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[7]  Ki Hang Kim,et al.  Special domains and nonmanipulability , 1980, Math. Soc. Sci..

[8]  M. Fleurbaey,et al.  Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy , 1997 .

[9]  B. Peleg,et al.  Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences , 1990 .

[10]  Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences , 2002 .

[11]  丸山 徹.  Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について , 1977 .

[12]  Lin Zhou,et al.  Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods , 1991 .

[13]  Jacques Crémer.  Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms , 1996 .

[14]  Eitan Muller,et al.  The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness , 1977 .

[15]  E. Maskin,et al.  A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms , 1980 .

[16]  M. Breton,et al.  Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences , 1999 .

[17]  Yves Sprumont.  Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments , 1995 .

[18]  Robert J. Aumann,et al.  16. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games , 1959 .

[19]  V. Danilov.  The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree , 1994 .

[20]  Matthew O. Jackson,et al.  A crash course in implementation theory , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..

[21]  Hervé Moulin.  On the fair and coalition-strategyproof allocation of private goods , 1993 .

[22]  Rakesh V. Vohra,et al.  Strategy-proof Location on a Network , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[23]  Gabrielle Demange,et al.  Single-peaked orders on a tree , 1982, Math. Soc. Sci..

[24]  Kim C. Border,et al.  Straightforward Elections, Unanimity, and Phantom Voters , 1983 .

[25]  M. Whinston,et al.  Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts , 1987 .

[26]  Salvador Barberà,et al.  An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..

[27]  M. Whinston,et al.  Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications , 1987 .

[28]  Jean-Jacques Laffont,et al.  On Coalition Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[29]  Salvador Barberà,et al.  Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework , 1979 .

[30]  M. Satterthwaite.  Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[31]  E. Maskin,et al.  The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[32]  Arunava Sen,et al.  Separable Preferences, Decomposability and Strategyproofness , 1999 .

[33]  Faruk Gul,et al.  Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees , 1993 .

[34]  Eric Maskin,et al.  Implementation and strong Nash equilibrium , 1978 .

[35]  Salvador Barberà,et al.  Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? , 2010, J. Econ. Theory.

[36]  Salvador Barberà,et al.  A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes , 1979 .

[37]  H. Moulin.  Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods , 1994 .

[38]  David Martimort,et al.  Collusion under Asymmetric Information , 1997 .

[39]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points , 1981 .

[40]  Philip Wolfe,et al.  Contributions to the theory of games , 1953 .