Cryptographic protocols implementation security verification of the electronic voting system based on blind intermediaries

The development of electronic voting systems is a complex and urgent task in today's time. At the heart of the security of any system using network interaction are cryptographic protocols. Their quality is verified by means of formal verification. However, formal verification tools work with protocols in an abstract form of Alice-Bob format, which does not allow to completely check the protocol for all sorts of attacks. In addition, when implementing the protocol in practice using any programming language, it is possible to change this protocol relative to its original form. As a result, the abstract initial form of the protocol, which was verified by means of formal verification, is considered safe, but a modified implemented protocol that has a different type can no longer be recognized as safe. Thus, verification of the cryptographic protocol of the electronic voting system using source codes is relevant. The paper described an electronic voting system based on blind intermediaries. A parser is described to extract the structure of the cryptographic protocol with which the structure of the voting protocol was obtained. The cryptographic e-voting protocol was translated into the CAS+ specification language for the Avispa automated verifier for protocol security verification.

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