“I remember thinking …”: Neural activity associated with subsequent memory for stimulus-evoked internal mentations

Conscious thought involves an interpretive inner monologue pertaining to our waking experiences. Previous studies focused on the mechanisms that allow us to remember externally presented stimuli, but the neurobiological basis of the ability to remember one’s internal mentations remains unknown. In order to investigate this question, we presented participants with sentences and scanned their neural activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as they incidentally produced spontaneous internal mentations. After the scan, we presented the sentences again and asked participants to describe the specific thoughts they had during the initial presentation of each sentence. We categorized experimental trials for each participant according to whether they resulted in subsequently reported internal mentations or not. The results show that activation within classic language processing areas was associated with participants’ ability to recollect their thoughts. Activation within mostly right lateralized and medial “default-mode network” regions was associated with not reporting such thoughts.