Trilevel Modeling of Cyber Attacks on Transmission Lines

Modern power system becomes more prone to cyber attacks due to the high integration of information technology and communication network. In this paper, we investigate the impact of multiple solutions to the security constrained economic dispatch, a tool used by power system operators to ensure the economics and security of the system operation, on the line attacking strategy, and model the line cyber-attack problem as a trilevel mixed integer linear programming problem. We convert the middle and lower levels into a single-level optimization problem using a weighting factor without introducing any additional variables and constraints. The simulation results on the modified IEEE 14-bus system verify the correctness of the proposed model.

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