Mitigation of the Eclipse Attack in Chord Overlays

Abstract Distributed Hash Table-based overlays are widely used to support efficient information routing and storage in structured peer- to-peer networks, but they are also subject to numerous attacks aimed at disrupting their correct functioning. In this paper we analyze the impact of the Eclipse attack on a Chord-based overlay in terms of number of key lookups intercepted by a collusion of malicious nodes. Moreover, we propose some modifications to the Chord routing protocol in order to mitigate its effects. Such countermeasures can operate in a distributed fashion or assume the presence of a centralized trusted entity and introduce a limited traffic overhead. The effectiveness of the proposed mitigation techniques has been shown through numerical results.

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