The theory of the firm

Publisher Summary The theory of the firm has long posed a problem for economists. This chapter discusses the analytical models of the firm that go beyond the black-box conception of a production function. The firm is seen as a contract among a multitude of parties. The main hypothesis is that contractual designs, both implicit and explicit, are created to minimize transaction costs between specialized factors of production. This follows Coase's original hypothesis that institutions serve the purpose of facilitating exchange and can best be understood as optimal accommodations to contractual constraints rather than production constraints. There are three problems that need attention. A first step is to develop and apply techniques that deal with nonstandard problems, such as incomplete contracts, bounded rationality, and multi-lateral contracting. The second step ought to integrate observations from neighboring fields, such as sociology and psychology, in a consistent way into the theoretical apparatus. The third step will be to increase the evidence/theory ratio, which is currently very low in this field.

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