Topics in Social Choice: Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation

Preface Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental Evidence Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-Frank The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures The Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NF The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Tacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four Models Efficacy and "Correct Decisions" Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval Procedures Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting? On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting Majority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum Paradox Proportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting Procedures Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval Procedures Appendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6 Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2 Bibliography Author Index Subject Index