The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis

The theory of repeated games occupies a central place in noncooperative game theory as it forms a relatively simple platform from which to study dynamic aspects of strategic interaction. In this paper we attempt a synthesis of the various folk theorems by adpting a point of view which de-emphasizes the choice of horizon.

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