The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary.

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