The Nemesis of Project Management: The Gaping Non-contractual Gap

As projects grow in size and complexity, they become ever more difficult to manage. Project management often stumbles in very large and complex projects. Time and cost overruns are rife in such cases. As I will show, one of the key reasons for this is that non-contractual relationships between project parties begin to dominate contractual relationships as projects grow in size and complexity. The non-contractual gap also grows at a growing rate. It cannot be mastered by more contracts, however. Trust is the only viable way forward.

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