论文信息 - Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs

Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs

In this paper, I analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility composed of heterogeneous agents. I explore whether Becker's assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search. In an economy with explicit additive search costs, complementarities in joint production (supermodularity of the joint production function) lead to assortative matching. This is in contrast to previous literature, which had shown that in a search economy with discounting, assortative matching may fail even when the joint production function is supermodular. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

Alp E. Atakan

[1] Lones Smith,et al. The Marriage Model with Search Frictions , 1997 .

[2] G. Becker. Chapter Title: a Theory of Marriage a Theory of Marriage , 2022 .

[3] Lones Smith,et al. Assortative Matching and Search , 2000 .

[4] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[5] Michael Sattinger,et al. Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs , 1995 .

[6] Melvyn G. Coles,et al. Marriage and Class , 1997 .

[7] Hector Chade,et al. Two-Sided Search and Perfect Segregation with Fixed Search Costs , 1999, Math. Soc. Sci..

[8] Francis Bloch,et al. Two-sided search, marriages, and matchmakers , 2000 .