Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Attila Szolnoki,et al. Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions , 2015, Scientific Reports.
[2] Toshio Yamagishi,et al. Evolution of norms without metanorms , 1984 .
[3] Shinsuke Suzuki,et al. Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer , 2013, Scientific Reports.
[4] Attila Szolnoki,et al. Phase Diagrams for the Spatial Public Goods Game with Pool-Punishment , 2011, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.
[5] O. Leimar,et al. Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity , 2001, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.
[6] P. Richerson,et al. The evolution of indirect reciprocity , 1989 .
[7] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions , 2015, PLoS Comput. Biol..
[8] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Indirect reciprocity provides a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment , 2008, Nature.
[9] T. Yamagishi. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good , 1986 .
[10] Torsten Röhl,et al. An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons , 2012, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
[11] Chengyi Xia,et al. Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games , 2012, PloS one.
[12] Ulrich Berger,et al. Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity , 2011, Games Econ. Behav..
[13] Yoh Iwasa,et al. How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. , 2004, Journal of theoretical biology.
[14] R. Boyd,et al. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem , 2004, Nature.
[15] Josef Hofbauer,et al. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics , 1998 .
[16] Boyu Zhang,et al. The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract , 2013 .
[17] Francisco C. Santos,et al. Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies , 2016, PLoS Comput. Biol..
[18] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information , 2015, Games.
[19] Arne Traulsen,et al. Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions , 2014, Journal of theoretical biology.
[20] Karl Sigmund,et al. The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation. , 2004, Journal of theoretical biology.
[21] Francisco C. Santos,et al. Stern-Judging: A Simple, Successful Norm Which Promotes Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity , 2006, PLoS Comput. Biol..
[22] David G. Rand,et al. Human cooperation , 2013, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
[23] Karl Sigmund,et al. Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard. , 2005, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[24] Yamir Moreno,et al. Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups , 2015, Scientific Reports.
[25] M. Nowak,et al. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring , 1998, Nature.
[26] Arne Traulsen,et al. Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons , 2010, Nature.
[27] Karthik Panchanathan,et al. A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. , 2003, Journal of theoretical biology.
[28] Attila Szolnoki,et al. Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions , 2010, PLoS Comput. Biol..