论文信息 - Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY

Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round MISTY

The block ciphers MISTY1 and MISTY2 proposed by Matsui are based on the principle of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. This paper presents attacks on reduced-round variants of both ciphers, without as well as with the key-dependent linear functions FL. The attacks employ collision-searching techniques and impossible differentials. KASUMI, a MISTY variant to be used in next generation cellular phones, can be attacked with the latter method faster than brute force when reduced to six sounds.

Ulrich Kühn | Ulrich Kühn

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