Is There a Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game?

This report seeks to determine whether the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle is robust enough to survive in an original payoff domain of the prisoner’s dilemma game. It was found that the sure-thing principle was violated in the domain of gains as expected by Shafir and Tversky but obeyed in the domain of losses. It was further found that the sure-thing principle was also obeyed in the original prison sentence payoffs, which fall into the domain of losses. The findings suggest a reexamination of the application of the sure-thing principle in the prisoner’s dilemma game.

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