UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR AND SPEECH ACT THEORY

As philosophers and universal grammarians of the classical age have already pointed out, the primary functions of language are to enable human speakers to express and communicate with accuracy and efficiency their conceptual thoughts. 1 Thus one can raise the question: Are there transcendent features that any natural language must possess in order to be able to fulfil its two basic functions of expression and of communication, and if yes, what is their nature? According to speech act theory, the primary units of meaning in the use and comprehension of language are not isolated propositions but rather speech acts of the type called by Austin (1962) illocutionary acts. Speakers who make meaningful utterances of elementary sentences always relate propositional contents to the world with a certain illocutionary force. They mean to perform in the context of their utterances elementary illocutionary acts such as assertions, questions, orders, declarations and thanks. It is part of what they intend to communicate to their hearers. Moreover they contribute to conversations with the intention of performing with other speakers collective illocutionary acts such as exchanging greetings, giving news, making a deliberation or changing things by way of making official declarations. Because speakers express and communicate their thoughts in the very performance of illocutionary acts, speech act theory contributes to the theory of linguistic universals in formulating the necessary and universal laws governing the successful performance and satisfaction of all kinds of illocutionary acts in language use and comprehension. As I will argue, the logical form of illocutionary acts imposes certain formal constraints on the logical structure of a possible natural language as well as on the mind of competent speakers. In particular, certain syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features are transcendent and universal because they are indispensable. A language deprived of such features would not provide for its human speakers adequate means of expression and of communication of their conceptual thoughts. Moreover, if linguistic competence is the ability to perform and understand illocutionary acts, then competent speakers and hearers must have certain mental states and abilities which are, in general, traditionally related to the faculty of reason. For example, speakers must be able to refer and predicate and to distinguish truth from falsehood, success from failure and satisfaction from insatisfaction. They must also be able to make certain theoretical and practical valid inferences and to coordinate intelligently their contributions to discourse. Otherwise, they would not be fully able to use and understand a