Verifying the Consistency of Remote Untrusted Services with Commutative Operations

A group of mutually trusting clients outsources a computation service to a remote server, which they do not fully trust and that may be subject to attacks. The clients do not communicate with each other and would like to verify the correctness of the remote computation and the consistency of the server’s responses. This paper first presents the Commutative-Operation verification Protocol (COP) that ensures linearizability when the server is correct and preserves fork-linearizability in any other case. All clients that observe each other’s operations are consistent, in the sense that their own operations and those operations of other clients that they see are linearizable. Second, this work extends COP through authenticated data structures to Authenticated COP , which allows consistency verification of outsourced services whose state is kept only remotely, by the server. This yields the first fork-linearizable consistency verification protocol for generic outsourced services that (1) relieves clients from storing the state, (2) supports wait-free client operations, and (3) handles sequences of arbitrary commutative operations.