Manipulating municipal budgets: unveiling opportunistic behavior of Italian mayors

[1]  Christian Raffer.  Accrual Accounting and the Local Government Budget - A Matching Evaluation , 2020 .

[2]  Michela Redoano,et al.  Political competition, tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy , 2019, European Journal of Political Economy.

[3]  Luca Repetto.  Political Budget Cycles with Informed Voters: Evidence from Italy , 2018 .

[4]  Andrew Goodman-Bacon.  Difference-in-Differences with Variation in Treatment Timing , 2018, Journal of Econometrics.

[5]  Liyang Sun,et al.  Estimating Dynamic Treatment Effects in Event Studies With Heterogeneous Treatment Effects , 2018, Journal of Econometrics.

[6]  Pedro H. C. Sant'Anna,et al.  Difference-in-Differences with Multiple Time Periods , 2018, Journal of Econometrics.

[7]  Emanuele Bracco.  A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement , 2018 .

[8]  L. Forni,et al.  Fiscal Rules to Tame the Political Budget Cycle: Evidence from Italian Municipalities , 2017, European Journal of Political Economy.

[9]  E. Dubois.  Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus , 2016, Public Choice.

[10]  Shawn R. Moulton,et al.  Political budget cycles in U.S. municipalities , 2015 .

[11]  A. Alesina,et al.  Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities , 2014 .

[12]  Bernardino Benito,et al.  The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure , 2013 .

[13]  Felipe Carozzi,et al.  Sending the Pork Home: Birth Town Bias in Transfers to Italian Municipalities , 2013, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[14]  C. Hoxby,et al.  The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts , 2012 .

[15]  Sérgio Naruhiko Sakurai,et al.  Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level , 2011 .

[16]  Massimo Bordignon,et al.  Who Do You Blame in Local Finance? An Analysis of Municipal Financing in Italy , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[17]  Allan Drazen,et al.  Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence , 2010 .

[18]  Raj Chetty,et al.  Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence , 2007 .

[19]  Min Shi,et al.  Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? , 2006 .

[20]  Dilip Mookherjee,et al.  Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries , 2005 .

[21]  E. Zhuravskaya,et al.  Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting , 2003 .

[22]  Jean-Robert Tyran,et al.  A Little Fairness May Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy , 2002 .

[23]  Y. Sawada,et al.  Do Community-Managed Schools Work? An Evaluation of El Salvador's EDUCO Program. Working Paper Series on Impact Evaluation of Education Reforms. Paper No. 8. , 1998 .

[24]  H. Wolman,et al.  Are there Election-Driven Tax-and-Expenditure Cycles for Urban Governments? , 1993 .

[25]  Kenneth S. Rogoff,et al.  Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles , 1986 .

[26]  W. Nordhaus.  The Political Business Cycle , 1975 .

[27]  Tommaso Giommoni.  Does Progressivity Always Lead to Progress? The Impact of Local Redistribution on Tax Manipulation , 2019, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[28]  F. Veiga,et al.  Political business cycles at the municipal level , 2004 .