Two-Phase Cooperative Bargaining Game Approach for Shard-Based Blockchain Consensus Scheme

In the last few years, blockchain technologies have come to the forefront of the research and industrial communities as they bring potential benefits for many industries. Even though the blockchain is a safe, reliable, and innovative mechanism, current blockchain solutions have fatal drawbacks of non-supervision and huge computational overhead. Therefore, they cannot be directly applied for real world operations. To resolve this problem, a novel model is presented in this study where the key idea is to split the transactions among multiple shards while processing them in parallel. To achieve the maximum system efficiency through the shard mechanism, we focus on the cooperative game theory. Based on the egalitarian bargaining solution, total transactions per each time period are divided for each shard. According to the proportional bargaining solution, assigned transactions in each individual shard are validated by blockchain nodes in a distributed manner. The main advantage of our two-phase bargaining game model is to provide an axiom-based strategic solution for the shard-based consensus problem while dynamically responding to the current blockchain network conditions. The numerical simulation results show that the effectiveness and efficiency of our game based approach by comparing the existing state-of-the-art blockchain control schemes. In the conclusion, we present our conclusions and provide important future research directions based on the combination of blockchain with other technologies.

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