European Differences in Executive Pay and Corporate Governance

Executive pay and corporate governance issues continue to attract wide academic, media and policy attention. The very high salaries enjoyed by senior executives in corporations in some economies are often contrasted with the relatively low pay received by executives in other economies. The case of the United states (high CEO pay) and Japan (low CEO pay) is an obvious example.

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