INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS

This article is intended to enhance the position of stakeholder theory as an integrating theme for the business and society field. It offers an instrumental theory of stakeholder management based on a synthesis of the stakeholder concept, economic theory, behavioral science, and ethics. The core theory—that a subset of ethical principles (trust, trustworthiness, and cooperativeness) can result in significant competitive advantage—is supplemented by nine research propositions along with some research and policy implications.

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