论文信息 - A characterization for qualified majority voting rules

A characterization for qualified majority voting rules

Abstract We give an axiomatization for Qualified Majority Voting Rules where one of the alternative is socially chosen if it obtains the support of 100 · q % of the non-abstaining voters for some q ∈ ]0, 1[. These voting rules do not satisfy Neutrality in general. Instead, we introduce the axiom of Coalition Permanency.

Nicolas Houy | N. Houy

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