Fall

In the first part of the course, we will review the main solutions to the mind-body interaction (dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, computer functionalism, eliminativism, anomalous monism, supervenience, biological naturalism among others), their merits and difficulties. Hylomorphism will be presented as an alternative to the problems of reductive physicalism and dualism while acknowledging their intuitions.

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