Military Applications and Sensitivity Analysis of Coupling Game Management

Coupling game theory can be used to formulate cases "lying between" non-cooperative games and cooperative games and it can provide more reasonable control strategies for players. Traditional Transferable Utility (TU) cooperative games, non-cooperative games, and two-person zero-sum games are special cases of coupling game. This paper describes military applications of a coupling game. Approaches to determine coupling factors in a coupling game are discussed. Sensitivity functions about coupling factors are provided. UAV experiments confirm the benefits of applying coupling game theory in non-ideal complex military situations.

[1]  J. Nash.  THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[2]  Lotfi A. Zadeh,et al.  Fuzzy Sets , 1996, Inf. Control..

[3]  Jose B. Cruz,et al.  Role of cooperation in coupling game theory , 2007, Int. J. Control.

[4]  Genshe Chen,et al.  Game-Theoretic Modeling and Control of Military Air Operations with Civilian Players , 2006 .

[5]  Ming Li,et al.  Game-theoretic modeling and control of a military air operation , 2001 .

[6]  J. S. Przemieniecki.  Mathematical methods in defense analyses , 1994 .

[7]  Mo Wei.  Reconstruction theories of non-ideal games , 2006 .

[8]  Dongxu Li,et al.  Team dynamics and tactics for mission planning , 2003, 42nd IEEE International Conference on Decision and Control (IEEE Cat. No.03CH37475).

[9]  Robert L. Helmbold,et al.  Letter to the Editor-A Modification of Lanchester's Equations , 1965 .

[10]  W. Scherer,et al.  Using agent-based simulation to reduce collateral damage during military operations , 2004, Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE Systems and Information Engineering Design Symposium, 2004..

[11]  J. Nash.  Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. , 1950, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[12]  Stephen Yurkovich,et al.  Fuzzy Control , 1997 .

[13]  Wayne P. Hughes,et al.  Military Modeling , 1984 .

[14]  Erwin P. Rathgeb,et al.  The Honeynet quarantine: reducing collateral damage caused by early intrusion response , 2005 .

[15]  Michael Athans,et al.  Optimal Control , 1966 .

[16]  J. Cruz,et al.  On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games , 1973 .

[17]  G. Reeke.  Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind , 1991, Artif. Intell..

[18]  Kenneth R. Foster,et al.  Collateral damage: American science and the war on terrorism , 2005, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine.

[19]  Howard Brackney,et al.  The Dynamics of Military Combat , 1959 .

[20]  F. W. Lanchester,et al.  Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm , 1995 .

[21]  Stacy Marsella,et al.  A domain-independent framework for modeling emotion , 2004, Cognitive Systems Research.

[22]  Birger Tödtmann,et al.  The Honeynet Quarantine: Reducing Collateral Damage Caused by Early Intrusion Response , 2005, Sixth International Conference on Networking (ICN'07).

[23]  Dave Harris,et al.  A Modified Perspective of Decision Support in C 2 , 2002 .