The grammar of causatives and the conceptual structure of events

Analytic causative constructions can best be described as extensions of simpler kinds of expressions, rather than as reductions from more complex underlying structures. In particular, causatives of intransitive predicates (e.g. I made Mary cryj are viewed as modelled on simple two-participant clauses (like I ate the cake,), and causatives of transitive predicates (e.g. He had the servant taste the foodj are seen as modelled on simple threeparticipant clauses (like I gave Mary a flower, or She broke it with a hammer—i.e. mainly ditransitive and instrumental clause types). One especially important advantage of this approach is that it offers an explanatory semantic account of the Variation of case markings found in causative constructions (such as the rather general alternation of dative, or other non-oblique, with instrumental), itpredicts that such Variation is related systematically to the semantics ofcase markings in simple clauses, which is in fact the case. It is argued that accounts ofcase marking of causees formulated strictly in terms of a formal hierarchy ofcases cannot be adequate, given the semantic factors affecting the choice of case. The marking of the causee is a consequence of conceived differences in its role in the causal event, which relate to such aspects of event structure as (in)directness of causation and (relatedly) degree of agency and affectedness of participants. Such factors are elements ofcertain general conceptual models of causation. This approach not only has wider empirical coverage than syntactic, hierarchy-based accounts, but is simple, unified, has greater explanatory power both for cross-linguistic Variation andfor intricate intralinguistic distributional facts; finally, it accords with a cognitively-based view oflanguage, in which the knowledge underlying grammar is not qualitatively different from other aspects of human understanding and reasoning.