The Four Faces of Institutionalism: Public Policy and a Pluralistic Perspective

Contending conceptions of the “new” institutionalism claim to offer approaches that can develop generalizable social scientific theories of behavior. This article challenges that proposition, arguing that contingencies exist in which specific forms of institutionalism are best suited to addressing particular types of questions. Viewed through the prism of public policy, it develops the argument that “policy dictates politics.” It suggests that four variants of institutionalism (historical, new economic, normative, and billiard ball) are each systematically most appropriate to examine the issues in the policy domains of redistribution, regulation, modernization, and liberalization, respectively. “New institutionalism” has become a catchphrase concerning an approach to the study of social science. Yet the term conceals a number of distinct approaches that compete with one another as explanations of political behavior. Some proponents of variants of institutionalism assert that they are trying to develop general theories of behavior. Some of the contributors to this issue of the journal represent efforts drawn from these different traditions. In this article I offer a contrasting perspective, one embedded in the notion that theories of institutions have identifiable and delineated contours that make them most appropriate for explanations of specific kinds of problems. This argument is based more on intuition than on science. It is one that is explored neither as exhaustively nor as deliberately as I would like, but that reflects my current state of thinking. It is presented in the form of a “think piece” which I believe is suitable for a forum of the type offered by a “special edition” symposium. I propose that there are four forms of “new” institutionalism. Each has specific features that suggest they are systematically best suited to the study of particular forms of public policy by virtue of the distinct character of politics in that domain. Reorienting and extending the seminal work of Theodore J. Lowi, I outline a resulting contingent argument challenging the claim that any one form of institutionalism is most suited to developing a general theory. Rather, each policy domain has a particular set of characteristics that capture a particular dimension of politics, and no one

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