On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agentoptimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm. We show that the two mechanisms are equivalent, or TTCM is fair (i.e., respects agents’ priorities), or resource monotonic ,o rpopulation monotonic, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, if AOSM fails to be efficient (consistent) for a problem, TTCM also fails to be fair (consistent) for it. However, the converse is not necessarily true.

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