IPBSM: An optimal bribery selfish mining in the presence of intelligent and pure attackers

Blockchain is a “decentralized” system, where the security heavily depends on that of the consensus protocols. For instance, attackers gain illegal revenues by leveraging the vulnerabilities of the consensus protocols. Such attacks consist of selfish mining (SM1), optimal selfish mining ( ϵ ‐optimal), bribery selfish mining (BSM), and so forth. In existing works, the attacks only consider the circumstances, where part of miners are rational. However, miners are hardly nonrational in the blockchain system since they hope to maximize their revenues. Furthermore, attackers prefer intelligent tools to increase their power for more additional revenues. Therefore, new models are urgently needed to formulate the scenarios, where attackers are purely rational and intelligent. In this paper, we propose a new BSM model, where all miners are rational. Moreover, rational attackers are intelligent such that they optimize their strategies by utilizing reinforcement learning to boost their revenues. More specifically, we propose a new selfish mining algorithm: intelligent bribery selfish mining (IPBSM), where attackers choose optimal strategies resorting to reinforcement learning when they interact with the external environment. The external environment can be further modeled as a Markov decision process to facilitate the construction of reinforcement learning. The simulation results manifest that IPBSM, compared with SM1 and ϵ ‐optimal, has lower power thresholds and higher revenues. Therefore, IPBSM is a threat no to be neglected to the blockchain system.