Coalitional bargaining in networks

We analyze an infinite horizon, non-cooperative bargaining model for a general coalitional formation framework. In each period of the game an opportunity for a feasible coalition to form arises according to a stochastic process, and a randomly selected agent in the coalition makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Agents that reach an agreement exit the game and are replaced by clones. We characterize the unique stationary payoff by a convex program. We examine the implications of this characterization when the feasible coalitions are determined by an underlying network. We show how an agent's payoff is related to the centrality of his position in the network.

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