论文信息 - Monotonicity of Power Indices

Monotonicity of Power Indices

The paper investigates general properties of power indices, measuring the voting power in committees. Concepts of local and global monotonicity of power indices are introduced. Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf-Coleman, and Holler-Packel indices are analyzed and it is proved that while Shapley-Shubik index satisfies both local and global monotonicity property, Banzhaf-Coleman satisfies only local monotonicity without being globally monotonic and Holler-Packel index satisfies neither local nor global monotonicity.

F. Turnovec

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