Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information
暂无分享，去创建一个
[1] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information , 1986 .
[2] A. Shaked,et al. Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (Now published in Econometrica, vol.52, (1984), pp.1351-1364.) , 1984 .
[3] M. Satterthwaite,et al. Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .
[4] David M. Kreps,et al. Reputation and imperfect information , 1982 .
[5] D. Fudenberg,et al. Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games , 1981 .
[6] P. Diamond. A model of price adjustment , 1971 .
[7] A. Rubinstein. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .