bluffer ’ s guide to auctions
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Jean-Philippe Lévy,et al. The Economic Life of the Ancient World , 1930, Nature.
[2] V. Smith. Papers in Experimental Economics: An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior , 1991 .
[3] R. Cassady. Auctions and Auctioneering , 2023 .
[4] S. Thrupp,et al. A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza. Volume I: Economic Foundations , 1969 .
[5] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .
[6] Robert M. Stark,et al. Competitive Bidding: A Comprehensive Bibliography , 1971, Oper. Res..
[7] Theodore Groves,et al. Incentives in Teams , 1973 .
[8] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .
[9] Shelomo Dov Goitein,et al. A Mediterranean society : the Jewish communities of the Arab world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza , 1974 .
[10] M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .
[11] Qin Lu,et al. Preface , 1976, Brain Research Bulletin.
[12] Milan Mares,et al. On bargaining in games , 1976, Kybernetika.
[13] L. Hurwicz. On informationally decentralized systems , 1977 .
[14] R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans. Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey , 1979 .
[15] Jean-Jacques Laffont,et al. On Coalition Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .
[16] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .
[17] V. Smith. Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science , 1982 .
[18] Eric Maskin,et al. Auction Theory with Private Values , 1985 .
[19] R. McAfee,et al. Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .
[20] D. Graham,et al. Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions , 1987, Journal of Political Economy.
[21] Primitive and Peasant Markets , 1989 .
[22] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer , 1989 .
[23] Mark A Walker,et al. On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies , 1990 .
[24] Mark A. Satterthwaite,et al. The Bayesian theory of the k-double auction: Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity , 2018 .
[25] R. Porter,et al. Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions , 1992, Journal of Political Economy.
[26] Stephen J. Rassenti,et al. Designing a Uniform-Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation , 1993 .
[27] Yeon-Koo Che. Design competition through multidimensional auctions , 1993 .
[28] Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason,et al. Generalized Vickrey Auctions , 1994 .
[29] J. Mcmillan. Selling Spectrum Rights , 1994 .
[30] Ariel Rubinstein,et al. A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .
[31] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions , 2014 .
[32] Hal R. Varian,et al. Economic Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents , 1995, USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce.
[33] N. Economides,et al. Electronic Call Market Trading , 1995 .
[34] George Sofianos,et al. New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures , 1996 .
[35] Flavio M. Menezes,et al. Multiple-Unit English Auctions , 1996 .
[36] R. McAfee,et al. Analyzing the Airwaves Auction , 1996 .
[37] D. Cliff. Minimal-Intelligence Agents for Bargaining Behaviors in Market-Based Environments , 1997 .
[38] F. Branco. The Design of Multidimensional Auctions , 1997 .
[39] P. Cramton. The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment , 1997 .
[40] P. Klemperer. Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications , 1998 .
[41] Jeffrey O. Kephart,et al. Shopbots and Pricebots , 1999, IJCAI.
[42] Jeremy I. Bulow,et al. Prices and the Winner's Curse , 1999 .
[43] P. Klemperer. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature , 1999 .
[44] David C. Parkes,et al. iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction , 1999, EC '99.
[45] David C. Parkes,et al. Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , 1999, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce.
[46] Yoav Shoham,et al. Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions , 1999, IJCAI.
[47] Noam Nisan,et al. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions , 2000, EC '00.
[48] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
[49] Jesse A. Schwartz,et al. Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions , 2001 .
[50] Jesse A. Schwartz,et al. Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions , 2000 .
[51] Michael P. Wellman,et al. AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.
[52] Martin Pesendorfer. A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions , 2000 .
[53] Daniel Lehmann,et al. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics , 2000, EC '00.
[54] P. Klemperer. What Really Matters in Auction Design , 2001 .
[55] Martin Bichler,et al. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions , 2000, Decis. Support Syst..
[56] David H. Reiley. Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How? , 2000 .
[57] A. Roth,et al. Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet , 2000 .
[58] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. k-Price Auctions , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..
[59] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.
[60] M. Bichler. The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms , 2001 .
[61] Craig Boutilier,et al. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.
[62] Michael P. Wellman,et al. A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..
[63] Shou-De Lin,et al. Designing the Market Game for a Trading Agent Competition , 2001, IEEE Internet Comput..
[64] David C. Parkes,et al. Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges , 2001, IJCAI.
[65] David C. Parkes,et al. Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency , 2001 .
[66] Richard D. Tabors,et al. Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing? , 2001 .
[67] Peter Stone,et al. Autonomous Bidding Agents in the Trading Agent Competition , 2001, IEEE Internet Comput..
[68] P. Klemperer. How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions , 2001 .
[69] David Levine,et al. Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations , 2002, AAMAS '02.
[70] Bidding clubs in first-price auctions , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.
[71] Jacob K. Goeree,et al. The Amsterdam auction , 2002 .
[72] Noam Nisan,et al. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..
[73] Jianli Gong,et al. EXCHANGES FOR COMPLEX COMMODITIES: SEARCH FOR OPTIMAL MATCHES , 2002 .
[74] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions , 2002, Artif. Intell..
[75] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .
[76] Michael P. Wellman,et al. The 2001 trading agent competition , 2002, Electron. Mark..
[77] E. Maskin,et al. Implementation Theory∗ , 2002 .
[78] Lixin Ye,et al. Deciding Between Competition and Collusion , 2003, Review of Economics and Statistics.
[79] Christof Weinhardt,et al. The Montreal Taxonomy for Electronic Negotiations , 2003 .
[80] A. Regan,et al. Combinatorial Auctions for Transportation Service Procurement: The Carrier Perspective , 2003 .
[81] Moshe Babaioff,et al. Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation , 2003, EC '03.
[82] Sven de Vries,et al. Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey , 2003, INFORMS J. Comput..
[83] Igor Walukiewicz,et al. Distributed Games , 2003, FSTTCS.
[84] D. Parkes,et al. Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design , 2004 .
[85] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computational criticisms of the revelation principle , 2004, EC '04.
[86] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..
[87] Eugene Fink,et al. Exchange Market for Complex Goods: Theory and Experiments , 2004 .
[88] Andrea Giovannucci,et al. Towards automated procurement via agent-aware negotiation support , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..
[89] Lawrence M. Ausubel. An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects , 2004 .
[90] David C. Parkes,et al. Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions , 2005, Manag. Sci..
[91] David C. Parkes,et al. ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange , 2005, EC '05.
[92] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms , 2005 .
[93] Martin Bichler,et al. Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[94] P. Keskinocak,et al. Bidding strategies and their impact on revenues in combinatorial auctions , 2005 .
[95] Andrew B. Whinston,et al. Solving the combinatorial double auction problem , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[96] Ulrich Endriss,et al. Bidding Languages and Winner Determination for Mixed Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions , 2007, EUMAS.
[97] S. Parsons,et al. Everything you wanted to know about double auctions , but were afraid to ( bid or ) ask , 2006 .
[98] Subhash Suri,et al. Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..
[99] Michael P. Wellman,et al. Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions , 2006, EC '06.
[100] F. Ygge. Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , .
[101] L. Ungar,et al. An Ecient Approximation Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions , 2022 .