Notes from the EC'14 program chairs

This short document describes the process used to create the EC'14 program, as well some comments on our experience. This year the conference, which had been called the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, was renamed the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation to better reflect the actual makeup of the papers to be presented at the conference. The acronym EC was retained and EC'14 is the fifteenth iteration of the conference.

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[78]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Revenue maximization with a single sample , 2010, EC '10.

[79]  Yang Cai,et al.  Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions , 2012, SODA.

[80]  Emmanuel M. Pothos,et al.  Social Projection and a Quantum Approach for Behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma , 2012 .

[81]  Arpita Ghosh,et al.  Optimal contest design for simple agents , 2014, EC.

[82]  A. Roth,et al.  Free riding and participation in large scale, multi‐hospital kidney exchange , 2014 .

[83]  Richard Cole,et al.  The sample complexity of revenue maximization , 2014, STOC.

[84]  Shuchi Chawla,et al.  Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing , 2010, BQGT.

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[94]  Aaron Roth,et al.  Selling privacy at auction , 2015, Games Econ. Behav..

[95]  Rudolf Müller,et al.  Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good , 2013, Games Econ. Behav..

[96]  L. S. Shapley,et al.  College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage , 2013, Am. Math. Mon..

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[100]  Bo Li,et al.  Price Competition in an Oligopoly Market with Multiple IaaS Cloud Providers , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Computers.

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[102]  Adam Wierman,et al.  The economics of the cloud: price competition and congestion , 2014, PERV.

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[116]  Pingzhong Tang,et al.  Optimal mechanisms with simple menus , 2014, EC.

[117]  David C. Parkes,et al.  An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains , 2007, AAAI.

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[120]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Supply-limiting mechanisms , 2012, EC '12.

[121]  S. Matthew Weinberg,et al.  Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information , 2013, SODA.

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[123]  Sanjeev Khanna,et al.  Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse Seller , 2012, WINE.

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[126]  Laura A. Dabbish,et al.  Designing games with a purpose , 2008, CACM.

[127]  S. Matthew Weinberg,et al.  Pricing randomized allocations , 2009, SODA '10.

[128]  Denis Nekipelov.  Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design , 2014, SECO.

[129]  Alejandro M. Manelli,et al.  Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist , 2006, J. Econ. Theory.

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[131]  Sven Seuken,et al.  An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms , 2014, EC.

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[133]  Yiling Chen,et al.  39 Information Elicitation Sans Verification , 2013 .

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[135]  Tayfun Sönmez,et al.  Matching with Contracts: Comment , 2013 .

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[141]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design , 2010, FOCS.

[142]  Éva Tardos,et al.  Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals , 2013, EC.

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[144]  Tayfun Sönmez,et al.  Matching with Contracts: The Critical Role of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts , 2012 .

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[146]  Éva Tardos,et al.  Composable and efficient mechanisms , 2012, STOC '13.

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[149]  Christos Tzamos,et al.  Optimal Pricing Is Hard , 2012, WINE.

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[151]  S. Matthew Weinberg,et al.  Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions , 2013, SODA.

[152]  Itai Ashlagi,et al.  An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms , 2009, EC '09.

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[155]  Patrick Briest,et al.  Uniform Budgets and the Envy-Free Pricing Problem , 2008, ICALP.

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