Efficiency Evaluation of Cryptographic Protocols for Boardroom Voting

Efficiency is the bottleneck of many cryptographic protocols towards their practical application in different contexts. This holds true also in the context of electronic voting, where cryptographic protocols are used to ensure a diversity of security requirements, e.g. Secrecy and integrity of cast votes. A new and promising application area of electronic voting is boardroom voting, which in practice takes place very frequently and often on simple issues such as approving or refusing a budget. Hence, it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting have been already proposed. In this work, we introduce a security model adequate for the boardroom voting context. Further, we evaluate the efficiency of four boardroom voting protocols, which to best of our knowledge are the only boardroom voting protocols that satisfy our security model. Finally, we compare the performance of these protocols in different election settings.

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