Teechain: Scalable Blockchain Payments using Trusted Execution Environments

Blockchain protocols such as Bitcoin are gaining traction for exchanging payments in a secure and decentralized manner. Their need to achieve consensus across a large number of participants, however, fundamentally limits their performance. We describe Teechain, a new off-chain payment protocol that utilizes trusted execution environments (TEEs) to perform secure, efficient and scalable fund transfers on top of a blockchain, with asynchronous blockchain access. Teechain introduces secure payment chains to route payments across multiple payment channels. Teechain mitigates failures of TEEs with two strategies: (i) backups to persistent storage and (ii) a novel variant of chain-replication. We evaluate an implementation of Teechain using Intel SGX as the TEE and the operational Bitcoin blockchain. Our prototype achieves orders of magnitude improvement in most metrics compared to existing implementations of payment channels: with replicated Teechain nodes in a trans-atlantic deployment, we measure a throughput of over 33, 000 transactions per second with 0.1 second latency.

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