Rationality and Bounded Rationality

Economists have for long expressed dissatisfaction with the complex models of strict rationality that are so pervasive in economic theory. There are several objections to such models. First, casual empiricism or even just simple introspection lead to the conclusion that even in quite simple decision problems, most economic agents are not in fact maximizers, in the sense that they do not scan the choice set and consciously pick a maximal element from it.

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