Neural Simulation and Social Cognition

This article reviews the claim that mirror neurons are simulating neurons and the basis of an implicit simulation theory in regard to how we understand other persons. I claim that the equation of mirror system activation with an implicit simulation is unjustified, and I offer an alternative interpretation of the scientific data. The alternative considers mirror system activation as underlying part of an enactive perception in the social context.

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