MeLoDy: A Long-Term Dynamic Quality-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Geoffrey E. Hinton,et al. Parameter estimation for linear dynamical systems , 1996 .
[2] David C. Parkes,et al. Designing incentives for online question and answer forums , 2009, EC '09.
[3] Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis,et al. Quality management on Amazon Mechanical Turk , 2010, HCOMP '10.
[4] Guihai Chen,et al. Pay as How Well You Do: A Quality Based Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsensing , 2015, MobiHoc.
[5] Pietro Perona,et al. The Multidimensional Wisdom of Crowds , 2010, NIPS.
[6] Tom Minka,et al. How To Grade a Test Without Knowing the Answers - A Bayesian Graphical Model for Adaptive Crowdsourcing and Aptitude Testing , 2012, ICML.
[7] Xiaoying Gan,et al. Incentivize Multi-Class Crowd Labeling Under Budget Constraint , 2017, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
[8] Yang Liu,et al. A Bandit Framework for Strategic Regression , 2016, NIPS.
[9] Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis,et al. Quizz: targeted crowdsourcing with a billion (potential) users , 2014, WWW.
[10] Fenglong Ma,et al. Crowdsourcing High Quality Labels with a Tight Budget , 2016, WSDM.
[11] Aleksandrs Slivkins,et al. Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems , 2016, J. Artif. Intell. Res..
[12] Gerardo Hermosillo,et al. Learning From Crowds , 2010, J. Mach. Learn. Res..
[13] Chi Zhang,et al. Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms for Powering Mobile Crowdsensing , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Computers.
[14] Aleksandrs Slivkins,et al. Incentivizing high quality crowdwork , 2015, SECO.
[15] Mingyan Liu,et al. An Online Learning Approach to Improving the Quality of Crowd-Sourcing , 2015, SIGMETRICS.
[16] Hao Wu,et al. Relationship between quality and payment in crowdsourced design , 2014, Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 18th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design (CSCWD).
[17] Iordanis Koutsopoulos,et al. Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing systems , 2013, 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.
[18] Xi Chen,et al. Optimal PAC Multiple Arm Identification with Applications to Crowdsourcing , 2014, ICML.
[19] Brendan T. O'Connor,et al. Cheap and Fast – But is it Good? Evaluating Non-Expert Annotations for Natural Language Tasks , 2008, EMNLP.
[20] Siddharth Suri,et al. Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk , 2010, Behavior research methods.
[21] Andreas Krause,et al. Near-Optimally Teaching the Crowd to Classify , 2014, ICML.
[22] Yuandong Tian,et al. Learning from crowds in the presence of schools of thought , 2012, KDD.
[23] Klara Nahrstedt,et al. Quality of Information Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems , 2015, MobiHoc.
[24] Jing Wang,et al. Quality-Aware and Fine-Grained Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing , 2016, 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS).
[25] J. B. G. Frenk,et al. Two Simple Algorithms for bin Covering , 1999, Acta Cybern..
[26] Lin Gao,et al. Providing long-term participation incentive in participatory sensing , 2015, 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM).
[27] Anirban Dasgupta,et al. Aggregating crowdsourced binary ratings , 2013, WWW.
[28] Xiaohua Tian,et al. Quality-Driven Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing , 2015, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology.
[29] Gagan Goel,et al. Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets , 2014, 2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[30] Nihar B. Shah,et al. Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing , 2014, J. Mach. Learn. Res..
[31] Thomas P. Minka,et al. From Hidden Markov Models to Linear Dynamical Systems , 1999 .
[32] Björn Hartmann,et al. What's the Right Price? Pricing Tasks for Finishing on Time , 2011, Human Computation.
[33] Jennifer Widom,et al. CrowdScreen: algorithms for filtering data with humans , 2012, SIGMOD Conference.
[34] Xiaoying Gan,et al. Incentivize crowd labeling under budget constraint , 2015, 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM).
[35] Mihaela van der Schaar,et al. Reputation-based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications , 2011, 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.
[36] Bo Yang,et al. Efficient network management for context-aware participatory sensing , 2011, 2011 8th Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks.
[37] Jian Tang,et al. Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing , 2015, 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM).
[38] T. Moon. The expectation-maximization algorithm , 1996, IEEE Signal Process. Mag..
[39] Xiang-Yang Li,et al. How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint , 2014, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.
[40] Joseph Y.-T. Leung,et al. On a Dual Version of the One-Dimensional Bin Packing Problem , 1984, J. Algorithms.
[41] Yaron Singer,et al. Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets , 2013, WWW.
[42] Nasser M. Nasrabadi,et al. Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning , 2006, Technometrics.
[43] Laura A. Dabbish,et al. Labeling images with a computer game , 2004, AAAI Spring Symposium: Knowledge Collection from Volunteer Contributors.
[44] Shaojie Tang,et al. Good Work Deserves Good Pay: A Quality-Based Surplus Sharing Method for Participatory Sensing , 2015, 2015 44th International Conference on Parallel Processing.
[45] John C. Platt,et al. Learning from the Wisdom of Crowds by Minimax Entropy , 2012, NIPS.
[46] Bo Zhao,et al. The wisdom of minority: discovering and targeting the right group of workers for crowdsourcing , 2014, WWW.