论文信息 - A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME PREFERENCES - 字舞流文

A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME PREFERENCES

Etude d'un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete. Caracterisation d'une classe d'equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l'unicite de cet equilibre

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