A qualitative vickrey auction
暂无分享,去创建一个
Vincent Conitzer | Mathijs de Weerdt | Paul Harrenstein | M. D. Weerdt | Paul Harrenstein | Vincent Conitzer
[1] Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi,et al. Online auctions with re-usable goods , 2005, EC '05.
[2] E. Maskin,et al. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .
[3] M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .
[4] R. Vohra,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Mechanism Design without Money , 2007 .
[5] H. Moulin. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness , 1980 .
[6] Eitan Muller,et al. The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness , 1977 .
[7] Yoav Shoham,et al. Multiagent Systems - Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations , 2009 .
[8] A. Mas-Colell,et al. Microeconomic Theory , 1995 .
[9] W. K. Vickery,et al. Counter-Speculation Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[10] David C. Parkes,et al. Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions , 2005, Manag. Sci..
[11] Shigehiro Serizawa,et al. Vickrey allocation rule with income effect , 2008, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[12] J. Laffont,et al. Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments With Complete Information , 1992 .
[13] Mathijs de Weerdt,et al. Auctions with Arbitrary Deals , 2007, HoloMAS.
[14] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .
[15] Esther David,et al. Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attribute auctions , 2002, AAMAS '02.
[16] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[17] Jerry R. Green,et al. Incentives in public decision-making , 1979 .
[18] Yeon-Koo Che. Design competition through multidimensional auctions , 1993 .