An Introduction to Game Theory

This chapter is devoted to a more detailed examination of game theory. Game theory is an important tool for analyzing strategic behavior, is concerned with how individuals make decisions when they recognize that their actions affect, and are affected by, the actions of other individuals or groups. Strategic behavior recognizes that the decision-making process is frequently mutually interdependent. Game theory is the study of the strategic behavior involving the interaction of two or more individuals, teams, or firms, usually referred to as players. Two game theoretic scenarios were examined in this chapter: Simultaneous-move and multi-stage games. In simultaneous-move games the players effectively move at the same time. A normal-form game summarizes the players, possible strategies and payoffs from alternative strategies in a simultaneous-move game. Simultaneous-move games may be either noncooperative or cooperative. In contrast to noncooperative games, players of cooperative games engage in collusive behavior. A Nash equilibrium, which is a solution to a problem in game theory, occurs when the players’ payoffs cannot be improved by changing strategies. Simultaneous-move games may be either one-shot or repeated games. One-shot games are played only once. Repeated games are games that are played more than once. Infinitely-repeated games are played over and over again without end. Finitely-repeated games are played a limited number of times. Finitely-repeated games have certain or uncertain ends.

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