Translucency and the Irrationality of Straightforward Maximization

This chapter examines two challenges that have been posed against the Translucency Assumption: that the idea that people are translucent at all is psychologically implausible, and that people are insufficiently translucent for constrained maximization to be more advantageous than straightforward maximization. The first challenge is quickly defeated: empirical studies show that persons have surprising skill in predicting whether others are trustworthy or not, even if they are strangers to each other. The second challenge, that persons are insufficiently translucent for constrained maximization to be more advantageous than straightforward maximization, proves to be weightier. Although studies show strangers to be moderately translucent, this is less than Gauthier’s argument requires. The upshot is that constrained maximization is not advantageous if one is to have only isolated interactions. Matters change, however, if we add some realism to the analysis. It is argued that once we take into account that people have control over with whom they interact and that they prefer to interact with persons who have proven themselves to be trustworthy rather than with strangers, constrained maximization may be expected to trump straightforward maximization.