Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
暂无分享,去创建一个
Martin A Nowak | Christian Hilbe | Seung Ki Baek | Hyeong-Chai Jeong | M. Nowak | C. Hilbe | Hyeong-Chai Jeong | S. Baek
[1] Guillaume Fréchette,et al. Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma , 2015, American Economic Review.
[2] M Nowak,et al. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. , 1989, Journal of theoretical biology.
[3] Jonathan D. Levin,et al. Experimental Evidence , 2020, Vision and Perception.
[4] M. Nowak. Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.
[5] J. L. Gould,et al. The Quarterly Review of Biology , 2005, The Quarterly Review of Biology.
[6] Arne Traulsen,et al. Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking. , 2008, Journal of theoretical biology.
[7] Jstor. The journal of conflict resolution , 1957 .
[8] Young Jin Kim,et al. Network structures between strategies in iterated prisoners’ dilemma games , 2014, ArXiv.
[9] Beom Jun Kim,et al. Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. , 2008, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.
[10] David G. Rand,et al. Direct reciprocity in structured populations , 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[11] Jelena Grujić,et al. On the coexistence of cooperators,defectors and conditional cooperators in the multiplayer iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. , 2012, Journal of theoretical biology.
[12] Peter Duersch,et al. When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? , 2013, Int. J. Game Theory.
[13] Alex McAvoy,et al. Comment on "Imitation processes with small mutations" [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251-262] , 2015, J. Econ. Theory.
[14] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity , 2010, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
[15] Arne Traulsen,et al. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma☆ , 2015, Games Econ. Behav..
[16] G. Wilkinson. Reciprocal food sharing in the vampire bat , 1984, Nature.
[17] Attila Szolnoki,et al. Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations , 2014, Scientific Reports.
[18] Alexander J. Stewart,et al. From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma , 2013, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[19] L M Wahl,et al. The Continuous Prisoner:s Dilemma: I. Linear Reactive Strategies , 1999 .
[20] R. Rosenfeld. Nature , 2009, Otolaryngology--head and neck surgery : official journal of American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery.
[21] Luis A. Martinez-Vaquero,et al. Generosity Pays in the Presence of Direct Reciprocity: A Comprehensive Study of 2×2 Repeated Games , 2012, PloS one.
[22] Stig Stenholm,et al. On to experiment , 1988, Nature.
[23] F. A. Seiler,et al. Numerical Recipes in C: The Art of Scientific Computing , 1989 .
[24] Naoki Masuda,et al. Win-stay lose-shift strategy in formation changes in football , 2015, EPJ Data Science.
[25] Lael J. Schooler,et al. Forgetting Constrains the Emergence of Cooperative Decision Strategies , 2010, Front. Psychology.
[26] Maria Bigoni,et al. Cooperative Strategies in Anonymous Economies: An Experiment , 2012, Games Econ. Behav..
[27] Ethan Akin,et al. Stable Cooperative Solutions for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2012, ArXiv.
[28] R. Boyd. Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. , 1989, Journal of theoretical biology.
[29] ScienceDirect. Bulletin of mathematical biology , 1973 .
[30] E. V. Bergen,et al. Proceedings of the Royal Society B : Biological Sciences , 2013 .
[31] M. Nowak,et al. A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1993, Nature.
[32] Peter C. Fishburn,et al. Theory and decision , 2003 .
[33] Dov Samet,et al. A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games , 1988 .
[34] Alexander J. Stewart,et al. Collapse of cooperation in evolving games , 2014, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[35] E. B. Wilson. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. , 1919, Science.
[36] Arne Traulsen,et al. Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas , 2014, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[37] D. Stephens,et al. Discounting and Reciprocity in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2002, Science.
[38] Yamir Moreno,et al. Reputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups , 2015, Scientific Reports.
[39] Richard H. Enns,et al. The Numerical Approach , 2004 .
[40] H. Ohtsuki,et al. Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with multiple strategies. , 2008, Journal of theoretical biology.
[41] J. Herskowitz,et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA , 1996, Current Biology.
[42] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Imitation Processes with Small Mutations , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.
[43] Ulrich Kamecke,et al. Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games? , 2012 .
[44] F. C. Santos,et al. Emergence of fairness in repeated group interactions. , 2012, Physical review letters.
[45] Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau. Games and Economic Behavior , 2011 .
[46] B. Hong,et al. Journal of the Korean Physical Society: Preface , 2003 .
[47] M. Milinski. TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation , 1987, Nature.
[48] R. Trivers. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.
[49] M. Nowak,et al. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. , 1993, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[50] Ethan Akin,et al. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Good Strategies and Their Dynamics , 2012, 1211.0969.
[51] D. Fudenberg,et al. Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift? , 2007, Journal of theoretical biology.
[52] M. Milinski,et al. Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. , 1998, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[53] W. Press,et al. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent , 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[54] I. Ial,et al. Nature Communications , 2010, Nature Cell Biology.
[55] John Mann. The Frontiers of Psychology , 1935, Nature.
[56] Franz J Weissing,et al. The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation , 2015, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
[57] R. Boyd,et al. No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1987, Nature.
[58] David G. Rand,et al. Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation , 2014, Nature Communications.
[59] Manfred Milinski,et al. The Calculus of Selfishness , 2011 .
[60] Jim Engle-Warnick,et al. Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments , 2006 .
[61] M. Nowak,et al. Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do , 2015, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[62] K. Taylor. Natural justice. , 1998, The Lamp.
[63] David G. Rand,et al. Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails. , 2009, Journal of theoretical biology.
[64] O. Bagasra,et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 1914, Science.
[65] D. Fudenberg,et al. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations , 2004, Nature.
[66] M. Nowak,et al. Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance , 2013, PloS one.
[67] M. Milinski,et al. Cooperation through image scoring in humans. , 2000, Science.
[68] David G. Rand,et al. Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments , 2014, Scientific Reports.
[69] Martin A Nowak,et al. Optional games on cycles and complete graphs. , 2014, Journal of theoretical biology.
[70] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games , 2015, Journal of theoretical biology.
[71] K. Fehl,et al. Costs for switching partners reduce network dynamics but not cooperative behaviour , 2014, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
[72] P. Molander. The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment , 1985 .
[73] Chaitanya S. Gokhale,et al. How small are small mutation rates? , 2011, Journal of Mathematical Biology.
[74] John B. Shoven,et al. I , Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal.
[75] Drew Fudenberg,et al. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .
[76] R. Allen,et al. Economic theory , 2018, Integrative Governance.
[77] Martin A Nowak,et al. Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games , 2012, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[78] Max M. Krasnow,et al. Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters , 2011, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[79] L. Christophorou. Science , 2018, Emerging Dynamics: Science, Energy, Society and Values.
[80] F. A. Hayek. The American Economic Review , 2007 .
[81] Joshua B. Plotkin,et al. The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations , 2015, Games.
[82] M. Nowak,et al. Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations , 1992, Nature.
[83] C. Hauert,et al. Effects of increasing the number of players and memory size in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: a numerical approach , 1997, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.
[84] October I. Physical Review Letters , 2022 .
[85] Attila Szolnoki,et al. Evolution of extortion in structured populations , 2014, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.
[86] Julián García,et al. In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.
[87] M. Nowak. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life , 2006 .
[88] Guillaume Fréchette,et al. The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence , 2011 .
[89] M. Nowak,et al. Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies. , 2009, Journal of theoretical biology.
[90] E. Hill. Journal of Theoretical Biology , 1961, Nature.
[91] Edoardo Gallo,et al. The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation , 2015, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[92] William H. Press,et al. The Art of Scientific Computing Second Edition , 1998 .
[93] D. Fudenberg,et al. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. , 2005, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[94] P. Richerson,et al. The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups. , 1988, Journal of theoretical biology.
[95] Yi Tao,et al. Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas , 2015, PloS one.
[96] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations , 2004, Bulletin of mathematical biology.
[97] Arne Traulsen,et al. The Structure of Mutations and the Evolution of Cooperation , 2012, PloS one.
[98] M. Nowak,et al. The evolution of stochastic strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1990 .
[99] D. Kraines,et al. Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma , 1989 .