论文信息 - Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers

Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers

Abstract The paper analyzes a simple discrete-time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game in which, at each stage, there is a contest for the right to make a proposal. The pure stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff set is equal to the core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026.

R. Evans | Rob L. Evans

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