论文信息 - Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. - 字舞流文

Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity.

A game-theoretical analysis of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma shows that the evolution of ensembles of stochastic strategies displays a dynamics of high complexity and unpredictability.

M Nowak | K Sigmund | M. Nowak | K. Sigmund | M. Nowak

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