Reliable Intersection Computation within Malicious Environments

A secure calculation of common data (D 1 ∩ ... ∩ D n ) of different participants without disclosing D i is useful for many applications and has been studied as the Secure Multiparty Computation problem. However, proposed solutions assume all participants act “semi-honest”, which means participants may neither alter the protocol execution nor fake database content. In this contribution, we focus on malicious participant behavior and prove that an atomic exchange of common data is not possible under the assumption of malicious participants. We propose a mechanism to calculate the intersection of multiple participants, which does not only reduce the disclosure in case participants cheat by altering the protocol to a negligible amount, it is also resistant against malicious participants that cooperate in order to cheat others. Furthermore, it impedes database content faking, which could be done when using other protocols by participants in order to check if data is contained in the other’s databases. Last, we show experimentally the practical usability of our protocol and how the level of trust has an impact on the exchange speed of the intersection.

[1]  Wenliang Du,et al.  Secure multi-party computation problems and their applications: a review and open problems , 2001, NSPW '01.

[2]  Dawn Xiaodong Song,et al.  Privacy-Preserving Set Operations , 2005, CRYPTO.

[3]  Chris J. Mitchell,et al.  A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services , 1995, Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms.

[4]  Victor Shoup.  Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2005: 25th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 14-18, 2005, Proceedings , 2005, CRYPTO.

[5]  Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al.  Protocols for secure computations , 1982, FOCS 1982.

[6]  Tad Hogg,et al.  Enhancing privacy and trust in electronic communities , 1999, EC '99.

[7]  Benny Pinkas,et al.  Efficient Private Matching and Set Intersection , 2004, EUROCRYPT.

[8]  Stefan Böttcher,et al.  Sovereign Information Sharing Among Malicious Partners , 2006, Secure Data Management.

[9]  Whitfield Diffie,et al.  New Directions in Cryptography , 1976, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory.

[10]  Evimaria Terzi,et al.  On Honesty in Sovereign Information Sharing , 2006, EDBT.

[11]  N. Asokan,et al.  Optimistic protocols for fair exchange , 1997, CCS '97.

[12]  Taher ElGamal,et al.  A public key cyryptosystem and signature scheme based on discrete logarithms , 1985 .

[13]  Chris Clifton,et al.  Tools for privacy preserving distributed data mining , 2002, SKDD.

[14]  Alexandre V. Evfimievski,et al.  Information sharing across private databases , 2003, SIGMOD '03.

[15]  Aggelos Kiayias,et al.  Traceable Signatures , 2004, EUROCRYPT.

[16]  Jim Gray,et al.  Notes on Data Base Operating Systems , 1978, Advanced Course: Operating Systems.

[17]  Moni Naor,et al.  Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation , 1999, STOC '99.

[18]  Brian Randell,et al.  Operating Systems, An Advanced Course , 1978 .

[19]  Michael K. Reiter,et al.  Fair Exchange with a Semi-Trusted Third Party (extended abstract) , 1997, CCS.

[20]  N. Asokan,et al.  Asynchronous protocols for optimistic fair exchange , 1998, Proceedings. 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Cat. No.98CB36186).