When Do Fair Beliefs Influence Bargaining Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and the United States

In this research, we examine the influence of beliefs about fairness on bargaining behavior. Using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining contexts in Japan and the United States in which buyers' or sellers' fair beliefs are either in alignment with or in conflict with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding the relationship between fair beliefs and self-interest is central to understanding when fair beliefs will influence bargaining behavior. Our results demonstrate that fair beliefs predict bargaining behavior when they are aligned with one's own self-interest.

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