Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning

In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what extent electoral campaigns can raise awareness of issues and unravel information about candidates' political positions. We allow for microtargeting in which candidates target messages to subsets of voters. A candidate's message consists of a subset of issues and some information on her political position in the multi-dimensional policy subspace spanned by this subset of issues. The information provided can be vague, it can be even silent on some issues, but candidates are not allowed to bluntly lie about their ideology. Every voter votes for the candidate she expects to be closest to her but takes into account only the subspace spanned by the issues that come up during the campaign. We show that any prudent rationalizable election outcome is the same as if voters have full awareness of issues and complete information of policy points, both in parliamentary and presidential elections. We show by examples that these results may break down when there is lack of electoral competition, when candidates are unable to use microtargeting, or when voters have limited abilities of political reasoning. Allowing for negative campaigning restores the positive results if voters' political reasoning abilities are limited. It can even be achieved with just public campaign message in the presidential elections while parliamentary elections still require microtargeting of voters.

[1]  Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al.  On Rationalizability in Extensive Games , 1997 .

[2]  Monic Sun,et al.  Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes , 2008 .

[3]  Stephen Coate,et al.  An Economic Model of Representative Democracy , 1997 .

[4]  Steven Callander,et al.  Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..

[5]  Matthew Gentzkow,et al.  Competition in Persuasion , 2011 .

[6]  Mehdi Shadmehr,et al.  State Censorship , 2014 .

[7]  Simon Grant,et al.  Inductive reasoning about unawareness , 2013 .

[8]  Thomas Jensen Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition , 2009 .

[9]  David Pearce Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[10]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Strategic Information Revelation , 1990 .

[11]  Gretlein Rodney J,et al.  DOMINANCE SOLVABLE VOTING SCHEMES: A COMMENT , 1982 .

[12]  Aviad Heifetz,et al.  Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness , 2011 .

[13]  A. Prat Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare , 1999 .

[14]  Jean-François Laslier Ambiguity in Electoral Competition , 2006 .

[15]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Relying on the Information of Interested Parties , 1985 .

[16]  Richard J. Zeckhauser,et al.  Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives , 1969 .

[17]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Games with Unawareness , 2012 .

[18]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  Electoral competition under imperfect information , 2004 .

[19]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  Party objectives in the "Divide a dollar" electoral competition , 2005 .

[20]  Xiaojian Zhao,et al.  Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers , 2014, Math. Soc. Sci..

[21]  Sanford J. Grossman The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality , 1981, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[22]  Donald E. Stokes,et al.  Spatial Models of Party Competition , 1963, American Political Science Review.

[23]  Frédéric Koessler,et al.  Lobbying with two audiences: Public vs private certification , 2008, Math. Soc. Sci..

[24]  John R. Petrocik,et al.  Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies , 1983 .

[25]  M. Kaneko,et al.  Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1 , 1984 .

[26]  John R. Petrocik Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study , 1996 .

[27]  K. Shepsle The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition , 1972, American Political Science Review.

[28]  Riccardo Puglisi Being the New York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper , 2004 .

[29]  Stephen Coate,et al.  Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy , 2004 .

[30]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model , 1987 .

[31]  Burkhard C. Schipper,et al.  Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[32]  Mattias Polborn,et al.  Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning , 2006 .

[33]  Leandro Chaves Rêgo,et al.  Extensive games with possibly unaware players , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[34]  Humberto Llavador An agenda-setting model of electoral competition SERIEs-Journal of the Spanish Economic Association Provided in Cooperation with : Spanish Economic Association , 2011 .

[35]  D. Austen-Smith,et al.  Social Choice and Strategic Decisions , 2005 .

[36]  Gabriele Gratton Pandering and electoral competition , 2014, Games Econ. Behav..

[37]  R. Aumann,et al.  Unraveling in Guessing Games : An Experimental Study , 2007 .

[38]  Peter C. Ordeshook,et al.  Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources , 1985 .

[39]  Alex Cukierman,et al.  The Politics of Ambiguity , 1987 .

[40]  Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition , 2016 .

[41]  M. Osborne,et al.  A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates , 1996 .

[42]  Burkhard C. Schipper,et al.  Conditional dominance in games with unawareness , 2023, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[43]  Levent Çelik Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes , 2012 .

[44]  Joel Watson,et al.  Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms , 1997 .

[45]  Kenneth A. Shepsle,et al.  A Note on Zeckhauser's “Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives”: The Case of the Paradox of Voting , 1970 .

[46]  Richard D. McKelvey,et al.  Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation , 1980 .

[47]  Frédéric Koessler,et al.  When does a firm disclose product information , 2012 .

[48]  Daniel J. Seidmann,et al.  Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages , 1997 .

[49]  Steven J. Brams Game Theory and Politics , 2013, Dover Books on Science.

[50]  Scott Ashworth Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents , 2006, American Political Science Review.

[51]  A. Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy , 1957 .

[52]  Emel Filiz-Ozbay,et al.  Incorporating unawareness into contract theory , 2012, Games Econ. Behav..

[53]  Micael Castanheira,et al.  Electoral Competition Through Issue Selection , 2012 .

[54]  Robin Farquharson,et al.  Theory of voting , 1969 .

[55]  Hahrie Han,et al.  Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate? , 2007 .

[56]  Wioletta Dziuda,et al.  Strategic argumentation , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.

[57]  M. Janssen,et al.  On the Positive Role of Negative Political Campaigning , 2015 .

[58]  Valentino Larcinese,et al.  NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES PARTISAN BIAS IN ECONOMIC NEWS: EVIDENCE ON THE AGENDA-SETTING BEHAVIOR OF U.S. NEWSPAPERS , 2007 .

[59]  A. Downs An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy , 1957, Journal of Political Economy.

[60]  John G. Geer,et al.  In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns , 2006 .

[61]  Adam Meirowitz,et al.  Informational Party Primaries and Strategic Ambiguity , 2005 .

[62]  C. Hafer,et al.  Issue advocacy and mass political sophistication , 2013 .

[63]  Emir Kamenica,et al.  Bayesian Persuasion , 2009 .

[64]  T. Feddersen,et al.  Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information , 1997 .

[65]  Paul Heidhues,et al.  Hiding information in electoral competition , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..

[66]  Erkut Y. Ozbay Unawareness and strategic announcements in games with uncertainty , 2007 .

[67]  Enriqueta Aragonès,et al.  Ambiguity in election games , 2002 .

[68]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications , 1981 .

[69]  Communicating on electoral platforms , 2017, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

[70]  Jane Green,et al.  Owning the issue agenda: Party strategies and vote choices in British elections , 2008 .

[71]  Hideo Konishi,et al.  Salience: Agenda choices by competing candidates , 2004 .

[72]  Benjamin I. Page The Theory of Political Ambiguity , 1976, American Political Science Review.

[73]  J. Colomer,et al.  An agenda-setting model of electoral competition , 2012 .

[74]  Oliver Hart,et al.  Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids , 1980 .

[75]  A. Walter Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different? , 2014 .

[76]  Riccardo Puglisi,et al.  Being The New York Times: the Political Behaviour of a Newspaper , 2006 .

[77]  H. Moulin Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes , 1979 .

[78]  A. Glazer The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity , 1990, American Political Science Review.