The role of generosity on the evolution of cooperation

Abstract Cooperation between non-kin is a mysterious phenomenon and needs explanation from evolutionary perspective. The mechanism under which players choose to keep or stop the interaction with the current partner based upon what the current partner does can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. Animals including humans are error prone and sometimes fail in cooperating even when they intend to cooperate. In the presence of such an error, those who defected are not always players who intended to defect; therefore, it is not obvious whether stopping the interaction with a player who defected is a nice option or not. Additionally, are cooperators more or less likely to evolve when execution errors are present? By using a simple mathematical model, we reveal that generosity who misses defection by the partner and keeps the interaction can facilitate the evolution of cooperation and that mistakes can facilitate the evolution of cooperation.

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