论文信息 - The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets

The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets

We prove NP-completeness of deciding the existence of an economic equilibrium in so-called house allocation markets. House allocation markets are markets with indivisible goods in which every agent holds exactly one copy of some good.

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